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a character interfering little, if at all, with the ordinary pursuits
of life. The points to be ascertained in such case are
1. What is the special hallucination entertained? what its peculiar nature and character ? what its range of object, and the limits
within which it operates?
2. How does the hallucination affect the ordinary business pursuits of life ? Does it so absorb the action of the mental faculties
as to prevent them from being sufficiently occupied in the plans
and purposes of life? Is it of a character to lead to profitless
investments of capital ? Does it in any way tend to interfere with
life's ordinary avocations so far -as to prevent them from being
reasonably followed and attended to ? Does it render the party
incapable of managing his own affairs, so far that they are likely
to suffer materially in consequence of it? If so, the inquisition
should return him a lunatic. But if it be of a character such as
little, if at all, affects his ordinary business; leaving him, for all
business purposes, the self-direction of his affairs, he may still be
left in the possession of his own property, allowing his own
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volition to stand as a reason for his actions.

JURY TRIALS.
RIGHT TO DISCHARGE FOR DISAGREEMENT;
IN CRIMINAL CASES.

EFFECT OF DISCHARGE,

THE ALLEGED PRACTICE OF CARTING JURIES,

IN ENGLAND, QUESTIONED BY LORD LYNDHURST.

THE AMERICAN

AND ENGLISH CASES CONSIDERED.

The question has lately been raised in England in regard to the
effect of discharging the jury, in criminal cases. This subject-was
much doubted and discussed, at the American Bar, not many years
since, but, of late, there seems to have been a pretty general
acquiescence in the right of the courts to discharge juries, in their
discretion, and we are not aware that any distinction has, obtained
of late, in regard to the right to exercise that discretion, in ordi-
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nary criminal, as well as in civil causes. The distinction may have
been urged, at the bar, in argument, and it may have been adopted
by the courts, in some cases; but we have no such in mind. In
the following cases, the discharge of the jury in a criminal case is
held to be matter of discretion with the court: The.Peoplevs. Green,
1-3 Wendell 55; People vs. -Denton,2 Johns. Cas. 275; People vs.
Olcott, Id. 301; Hector vs. State, 2 Miss. R. 166. We shall recur
to this point again.
But the English courts, of late, have had this matter more than
once under consideration, and the views there entertained seem to
be somewhat at variance with the general practice in this country,
as stated above. In Regina vs. -harlesworth,1 B. & S. 460,
where the respondent was indicted for bribery at an election for
member of parliament, at the trial before HILL, J., the principal
witness for the crown refused to give evidence, and was committed
for contempt of court. The counsel for the crown moved the judge
to postpone the trial and discharge the jury, as it was impossible
for them to proceed, without the testimony of the witness now
committed for refusal to testify. The motion was opposed, on the
ground that the court had no such discretion. HILL, J., after consulting with KEATING, J., said he had determined to discharge the
jury, and postpone the trial, and should place the fact, with the
reason for it, upon the record; that it might be determined,
whether he had such power, and added, cIf he had the power, he
ought to exercise it, where a witness had wilfully tampered with
the ends of justice." A rule for discharging the respondent having
been obtained, it was argued at very great length by several
counsel on each side, and a large number of authorities, both
ancient and modern, many of them of the most conflicting character,
were cited. The judges of the King's Bench took time to consider,
and ultimately delivered judgments, seriatim, and of a very elaborate character.
Upon the general question of the effect of the judge discharging
the jury, in a case of misdemeanor, improperly, and against the
will of the respondent, after the trial had begun, the court came to
the conclusion, that it did not entitle the respondent to be dis-
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charged also, as upon a virtual acquittal. This would seem to be
the only rational conclusion in regard to the question; the only
wonder is, that, at this late day, it could have been brought so
.seriously in question before that court. But there is'some ground
of surprise, as it seems to us, that the court there should have
considered that the exercise of such a discretion, in the particular
case, was not warranted, " unless, perhaps, it could be shown that
the absence of evidence," on the part of the prosecution, "was
occasioned by collusion between the witness and the accused."
This remark -mayapply, with considerable force, to the general
right of asking to have the jury discharged, on the ground of the
unexpected absence of a material witness, after the trial began;
but if such defect of evidence was the result of causes wholly
beyond the control of the utmost watchfulness on the part of the
prosecution, as if a witness was suddenly smitten with severe sickness, coming into court, or waiting his turn, in court, or had gone
out of court, in defiance of the subpoena, or, as in the case before
the court, obstinately refused to give evidence; it would certainl
savor of unwonted strictness and severity, to discharge the respondent, before it could be known -what was the cause of the
defect of evidence, or whether it was likely to be soon removed,
or not.
The decision of the main question here is in accordance with
that of the Central Criminal Court, in Regina vs. Davidson, 2
F. & F. 251. In the last case, which was an indictment for an
indecent assault, the respondent pleaded, that he ought not to be
further prosecuted, because he had been once tried for the same
offence and the jury discharged. To this it was replied, on the
part of the crown, " that the jury having deliberated for a long
space of time, and being unable to agree, were discharged by the
court in the exercise of its discretion." The court held the plea
bad.
But in the trial of the case of Regina vs. Ckarlesworth, Crompton, J., made some very pertinent remarks in regard to a practice,
which has become a serious cause of -embarrassment-in the administration of justice, upon both sides of the Atlantic, within the last
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few years (1 B. & S. 523), as follows: cc I think that the practice
of discharging the jury, too soon, is objectionable. It is said they
should be discharged, if the judge sees that they are not likely to
agree. I think we should take some mean course. It is a dangerous thing to say that the jury should be discharged, in a certain
time, or in a few hours. I think that they should be kept, not to
coerce them, but for such a time, as that they should not be able
to say, ' We need not agree in a verdict; we will wait for such a
time and then we shall be.discharged.' Therefore I do not reprobate the old practice of confining a jury for a reasonable time.
Confining them without meat, drink, and fire, and exp9sing them
to hunger, thirst, and cold, is a barbarous relic of ancient times,
and should be got rid of. But I think they should be kept a
reasonable time, so that they may not wait for their discharge, in
order to avoid giving a verdict unpleasant to their feelings."
-The question in regard to the effect of discharging the jury, in
cases of felony and treason, seems not to have been settled in the
English courts. But in the case of Conway and Lynch vs. Regina,
7 Irish Law Rep. 149, which was a case of felony, it was decided,
three judges against one, that the discharge of the jury, by a
single judge, in such a case, might be pleaded in bar to a future
indictment for the same offence. But it seems to be the general
voice of all the early law writers, in England, and the admitted
tradition of the law, "that a jury sworn and charged in a capital
case, cannot be discharged, (without the prisoner's consent,) till
they have given a verdict. And notwithstanding some authorities
to the contrary in the'reign of King Charles II., this hath been
held for clear law, both in the reign of King James II. and since
the revolution :" 2 Hawk. P1. Cr. Ch. 47, § 1; Co. Litt. 227 b; 3
Inst. 110. And by some of these ancient authors the same rule
is extended to all felonies. What is here intended by " charged"
refers to the committing the prisoner to the jury for trial, which
was, and probably is now, done in a formal manner, in the English
courts, at the beginning of every trial for felony, and has no
reference to the summing up of the judge. But Lord Hale, 2
H. P1. Cr. 294, 295, lays it down, as every day practice in the
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English courts, to discharge the jury, after the trial had advanced
so far as clearly to indicate to the court, the atrocious guilt of the
prisoner and the probable existence of further evidence, showing
such guilt; and order a trial at a future term. 3.Bac. Ab. tit.
-Juries,' Letter G. 769.
We have before incidentally alluded to the American rule upon
this subject, that in ordinary criminal cases, not above the grade
of misdemeanor, it rests in the sound discretion of the court when
they will'discharge the jury, and order a new trial, either immediately or at a ftiture term. These questions have often arisen in
regard to discharging a single juror, who was disqualified from
further acting in the case, either on account of some disability
occurring during the trial, or of one existing but not brought to
the knowledge of the court, before the juror was impannelled.
This was so ruled in People vs. -Damon, 13 Wendell 351. This
was questioned in aarratvs. Garrat, 4 Yeates 244, and in State
vs. Williams, 3 Stew. 454. And in Hines vs. The State, 8
Humph. R. 597, it is decided, that if the court discharge a single
juror after he has been designated for the trial of a criminal case,
without legal grounds, the respondent will be entitled to a venire
de novo. But this may be legally done, on account of physical
inability in the juroi to act in the trial: 6 Humph. R. 249.
But many of the American courts hold, that in capital cases it
is no sufficient ground for discharging the jury, without the consent of the respondent, that the jury are unable to agree upon a
verdict; and that if the jury is so discharged, it is a bar to any
further prosecution for the offence: Commonwealth vs. Clue, 3
Rawle 498; State vs. -phraim, 2 Dev. & Batt. 162; Commonwealth vs. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577; Williams's Case, 2 Grattan 567.
Many of these cases, however, hold that where there is an invincible necessity for discharging the jury, a necessity which may
fairly be said to be beyond and above the control of any mere
human agency, both in its inception and its progress, and which
precludes absolutely the attainment of a verdict, the jury must be
discharged, even in capital causes, and that such discharge is no
bar to further prosecution for the same offence: Commonwealth vs.
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Clue, supra; State vs. Ephraim, supra. In this last case, RumI-,
C. J., said: " The jury cannot be discharged without the personal
consent of the accused, but for some evident, urgent, overwhelming
necessity, arising from matter accruing during the trial, and which
was beyond human foresight or control; and, generally speaking,
such necessity must be set forth in the record: Spier's Case, 1
Dev. 491, in which TAYLOR, 0. J., says, "That all the exceptions
ought to be confined to those cases of extreme and positive necessity which are dispensed by the visitation of God; and which
cannot by any contrivance of man be made the engines of obstructing that justice, which the safety of all requires should be done to
the state." In Commonwealth vs. Olue, aupra, GIBSON, 0. J.,
said: -The court may discharge the jury of a prisoner capitally
indicted, only in case of absolute necessity, to establish which it
is necessary that there be some other ingredient beside mere inability to agree." In the case of United States vs. Hfaskell and
_Francois, 4 Wash. C.C.R. 402, it is held, that insanity in one of
the jurors, appearing after the jury had been kept together three
days, and more than twenty-four hours without refreshment, was
good ground for discharging the jury in a capital cause, and that
such discharge of the jury is in the discretion of the court, and is
no bar to further prosecution. In this cause the grounds of the
discharge of the jury were entered in form upon the record.
In the case of United States vs. Perez, 9 Wheaton R. 579, it is
decided, that the discharge of a jury from giving a verdict in a
capital cause, without the consent of the prisoner, the jury being
unable to agree, is not a bar to a subsequent trial for the same
offence. STORY, Justice, said: "The prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, and may be again put upon his defence. We
think, in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of
justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any
verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances
into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, as the
ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated."
And in The People vs. Goodwin, 18 Johns. R. 188, it was decided, that in cases of felony or misdemeanor, if the jury, after
VoL. 10.-34
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deliberating so long as to exclude all reasonable expectation that
they will be able to agree in a verdict, "unless compelled to do so
by famine or exhaustion," are discharged, it will be no bar to further prosecution for the same offence. In this case the jury had
been out seventeen hours, and were discharged within half an hour
of the time when by law the court was bound to close its session.
In the case of People vs. Green, 13 Wendell 55, the same rule
-was applied to a similar case, except that the jury were discharged
after one-half hour's deliberation, and when there was no restriction in regard to "the time of adjournment of the court, it being
regarded as a matter absolutely within the discretion of the court.
The same view is taken in Commonwealth vs. Bowden, 9 Mass. R.
494. The jury here had "been confined together during part of
a day, and a whole night, and returned into court and informed
the judge, that they had not agreed upon a verdict, and that it
was not probable they ever could agree." One of the jurors was
accordingly withdrawn, and the panel discharged, and the prisoner
tried again, by another jury, during the same term, and convicted,
and the question came up on motion in arrest of judgment. And
in Commonwealth vs. Purchase, 2 Pick. R. 521, on a capital trial,
the jury were discharged, after a deliberation of eighteen hours,
it appearing to the court that there existed a difference of opinion
among them upon the evidence, which any further deliberation
would have no tendency to remove, and it was held no bar to further prosecution, and the prisoner was subsequently tried and convicted of manslaughter, and it was held a good conviction.
It is well settled, in the American courts, that one cannot be
said to have been put in "jeopardy of life or limb," within the
meaning of the United States constitution, unless he has been
either convicted or acquitted of the offence, so that the facts will
constitute a good plea of auterfois acquit, or auterfois convict,
which is only true, when there was both verdict and judgment
shown: 4 Black. Comm. 335; 1 Chitty Crim. Law 372; WAsHINGTON, J., in United States vs. Raskell, supra; SPENcER, C. J.,
in The People vs. Goodwin, supra.
The case of United States vs. Coolidge, 2 Gallison 364, is pre-
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cisely the same case in principle, as the late English case of Begina
vs. Charlesworth, supra, being a case of penalty or misdemeanor,
and an indispensable witness for the prosecution being committed
by the court for contempt, in refusing to give testimony, and the
jury discharged, and the cause postponed. Mr. Justice STORY
held, as HILL, J., did in the English case, that this was good ground
for postponing the trial, and discharging the jury. On this point,
it seems to us, the decision of these judges is more in consonance
with reason and principle than that of the King's Bench, that it
was not good ground for postponing the trial. But both decisions
concur in the legal effect of such postponement, that it is no bar
to further prosecution, being in the discretion of the court.
The American cases seem to agree in one respect, that a jury
cannot be discharged, in a capital case, and ought not to be in any
criminal case, except upon the strict ground of necessity. But
there is not the same concurrence in regard to the matter resting
altogether in the discretion of the court before whom the trial is
had, and not being subject to revision upon errors. The English
courts concur with the majority of the American courts, that the
question of necessity is one of fact, and that the decision of the
court before whom the question first comes is final. This seems
to us the only practicable rule upon the subject. For the disagreement of a jury, which ought, we think, in all cases, civil or
criminal, to be regarded as not being one of necessity for a discharge, until pushed to the utmost limit of reasonable hope, or
until the jury become desperate, and incapable of further effort,
without unreasonable pressure and constraint, may nevertheless
become a cause of real, infallible necessity, as much as sickness or
insanity; and it must then be treated in the same manner as any
other necessity, and the court before whom the trial is had is the
only proper tribunal to determine this necessity, and their decision
cannot be reversed on error, because, in the nature of things, it is
impossible to state all the facts and circumstances in the case, precisely as they appear in the court below. The discharge of the
jury, therefore, in a criminal cause, ought not to be regarded as a
bar to further prosecution, unless it appear clearly that it was for
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insufficient reasons, and when no legal necessity existed in the
case for such a course, as was held in State vs. Vaterhouse, Mart.
& Yerg. 278.
Some curious discussions have lately arisen in England and
Ireland, in the cases already named, and in a debate in the House
of Lords in which Lord Lyndhurst took part, in regard to the fact
of the jury having even been carted about the circuit,. as matter of
indignity to them, by way of punishment for not performing their
duty, as it has been alleged was done in ancient times in those
countries. His lordship insists that no such thing ever occurred in
England, although it is admitted to have occurred in Ireland
within the memory of man, but that the tradition arose from the
misconstruction of the abbreviation "en charr." which really
meant a covered wagon instead of an open cart, and that the jury
were carried along with the judge of the circuit, in the usual and
most comfortable mode of travel in that day, in order to give them
more ample opportunity to digest the case, and ultimately to come
to an agreement! We have no confidence in these modern glosses
upon ancient traditions. The text is far more reliable than the
commentary. But all must rejoice that such a barbarous practice
is not only discontinued, but that the disfavor with which it is now
viewed is fast bringing the belief of its former existence into
question.
We should venture to say more in regard to the policy of discharging juries in cases committed to them, both civil and criminal,
after a short consultation, and the assurance of the foreman, that
they will not be likely to agree, if we supposed it would be useful.
We believe this practice to be a vicious one every way, and that it
has done more than any one thing else, to bring jury trials into
disrepute, in this country. And when it is considered that the
law nowhere provides for any such thing as the discharge of a jury,
for disagreement, and that the practice has grown up out of the
necessities incident to that mode of trial, we must all feel, that
such a practice, resting upon mere necessity, "which knows no
law," should be carefully restricted within the narrowest limits
possible. And we think the discharge of the jury ought not to be
referred to the consent of the parties, exclusively, as was formerly
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the practice in the American courts to a great extent. This
practice enables the parties to control the business of the courts,
in important particulars, in regard to which other suitors have an
important interest. And it enables the parties to bid against each
other in open court, often, for showing deference and indulgence
to the opinions and feelings of the jurors, which is an undignified
and unworthy practice, and one not to be encouraged. The judge
should hold all these matters under his own control, and if he is
fit for his place, he will do it, with a firm but gentle hand, so that
the course of justice will be quiet and easy, but ever onward; so that
it will soon come to be the feeling of every one about him that the
business must be finished, and that it is just as likely to be well
done, by the first jury, as any other, and that as the law has
established this mode of trial, requiring the unanimous verdict of
twelve men, it expects compromise and concession, and that such
qualities of mind, instead of being evidence of mental imbecility,
are more creditable on the score of wisdom' and judgment, than
that dogged obstinacy of opinion, which is more commonly the
result of weakness, or inexperience, than of anything else. We
do not believe there would occur the necessity of discharging a
jury, one time in a thousand, if the courts had the capacity to
make the bar, and the public, comprehend and feel, that such a
result, instead of being creditable to any one, evinced great want
of capacity in the jury as well as the court, and reflected no
special credit upon the counsel. But as long as those concerned
in the trial of causes are content with trying to try causes, and
feel themselves in no manner discredited by such a result, by the
failure to accomplish any good, the evil will be likely to continue.
-But if the evil should increase in the same ratio it has done for
some years past, it would soon render jury trials uIendurable, and
drive them out of practice, as it already has done, to a great
extent, in some localities. And this is a result which all wellwishers to the jurisprudence of the country should deprecate.
For, with all its evils, the jury trial, even in civil actions, is an
important security to the peace and good order of any country, so
perfectly free from governmental constraint as America has thus
I.F.R.
far been.

